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given a repeated choice between two or more options with independent and identically distrib-
uted reward probabilities, overall pay-offs can be maximized by the exclusive selection of the op-
tion with the greatest likelihood of reward. the tendency to match response proportions to re-
ward contingencies is suboptimal. nevertheless, this behaviour is well documented. A number of 
explanatory accounts have been proposed for probability matching. these include failed pattern 
matching, driven by apophenia, and a heuristic-driven response that can be overruled with suf-
ficient deliberation. We report two experiments that were designed to test the relative effects on 
choice behaviour of both an intuitive versus strategic approach to the task and belief that there 
was a predictable pattern in the reward sequence, through a combination of both direct experi-
mental manipulation and post-experimental self-report. Mediation analysis was used to model 
the pathways of effects. neither of two attempted experimental manipulations of apophenia, nor 
self-reported levels of apophenia, had a significant effect on proportions of maximizing choices. 
however, the use of strategy over intuition proved a consistent predictor of maximizing, across 
all experimental conditions. A parallel analysis was conducted to assess the effect of controlling 
for individual variance in perceptions of reward contingencies. Although this analysis suggested 
that apophenia did increase probability matching in the standard task preparation, this effect was 
found to result from an unforeseen relationship between self-reported apophenia and perceived 
reward probabilities. A Win-stay lose-shift (Wsls) analysis indicated no reliable relationship be-
tween Wsls and either intuition or strategy use.
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INTRODUCTION
Multiple examples of apparently suboptimal human choice behaviour 
have been empirically documented over the last century (Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; Shafir & LeBoeuf, 
2002; Stanovich, 1999). One prominent example is probability match-
ing, whereby people tend to select probabilistically rewarded responses 
in proportion to the relative likelihoods of reward, rather than the 
optimal strategy of always selecting the option with the highest reward 
probability (Shanks, Tunney, & McCarthy, 2002). Various explanatory 
accounts have been proposed for this behaviour. One possibility is that 
participants believe that the sequence of outcomes is determined not 
by chance, but by some relationship to their previous choices or previ-
ous outcomes. We refer to this category of model as the apophenia ac-
count. A second category of model suggests that the tendency to match 
response probabilities to reward probabilities is the result of a heuristic 
choice strategy that can be overcome by analysis and deliberation. We 
report two experiments in which we seek to assess the relative contri-
bution of each in determining choice behaviour.
this is an open access article under the cc By-nc-nd license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Probability Matching
Probability matching was first documented in rat behaviour under 
concurrent variable-ratio (VR) schedules of reinforcement (Brunswik, 
1939). In humans, it was first reported in a verbal conditioning para-
digm (Grant, Hake, & Hornseth, 1951; Jarvik, 1951) followed by a series 
of studies in which participants made repeated choices between proba-
bilistic and differentially rewarded options (Goodnow & Postman, 
1955; Neimark, 1956). This behavioural tendency is now supported 
by a comprehensive empirical literature in humans (Vulkan, 2000). 
In other animals the matching of choice proportions to the amount 
of reward obtained from each option has been consistently shown 
on concurrent variable-interval (VI) schedules. This phenomenon 
originated the now well-established matching law, although observed 
departures from strict matching have since required the inclusion 
of additional paremeters in what is termed the generalized matching 
law (Davison & McCarthy, 1988; Herrnstein, 1961; McDowell, 2013; 
Poling, Edwards, Weeden, & Foster, 2011). It is important to note that, 
on ratio schedules, the matching law predicts maximizing rather than 
probability matching, as discussed by Schulze, van Ravenzwaaij, and 
Newell (2017). This prediction has been supported in pigeons, which 
have been shown, under experimental conditions, to learn to ap-
proach maximizing behaviour on concurrent variable-ratio schedules 
(Herrnstein & Loveland, 1975). In the field of ecology however there is 
an overwhelming empirical consensus that, in natural environments, 
animals tend to allocate foraging time in proportion to the amount of 
resources available in different areas (Weber, 1998). Whether this situa-
tion is generally better approximated by a VR or VI schedule is open to 
question, though there are clearly other factors to take into account as 
well, such as reward persistence over time and the presence of competi-
tors (see Schulze, van Ravenswaaij & Newell, 2015, 2017). This foraging 
pattern has been termed the ideal free distribution (IFD, Fretwell, 1972; 
Fretwell & Lucas, 1970) and is well documented across a multitude of 
animal species. These include mallards (Harper, 1982), sparrows (Gray, 
1994), pigeons (Baum & Kraft, 1998; Bell & Baum, 2002), common 
cranes (Bautista, Alonso, & Alonso, 1995), rats (Tan et al., 2014), roe 
deer (Wahlstrom & Kjellander, 1995), white-tailed deer (Kohlmann & 
Risenhoover, 1997), guppy fish (Abrahams, 1989), cichlid fish (Godin 
& Keenleyside, 1984; Grand & Grant, 1994; Tregenza & Thompson, 
1998), coho salmon (Grand, 1997), wood ants (Lamb & Ollason, 1993), 
dung flies (Blanckenhorn, Morf, & Reuter, 2000), and in bumblebees 
both directly in terms of IFD (Dreisig, 1995) and analogous “majoring 
and minoring” long-term foraging behaviour (Heinrich, 1979). 
Apophenia
Apophenia is the tendency to perceive illusory patterns in random and 
unconnected events or stimuli (Conrad, 1958). In humans, this is an 
empirically well-documented phenomenon (Ayton & Fischer, 2004; 
Falk & Konold, 1997; Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985). Moreover, 
a number of studies have reported that participants often perceive pat-
terns in the sequences of outcomes in a standard probability learning 
task, even when none are present, and that this perception is associated 
with probability matching. Jarvik (1951) found that over half of par-
ticipants believed a two-alternative forced choice verbal-conditioning 
sequence to derive from some form of pattern. Goodnow (1955) found 
overmatching in a task framed as gambling, but that participants’ be-
haviour reverted to probability matching when they were instructed 
to “search for a principle.” Both Rubinstein (1959) and Peterson and 
Ulehla (1965) found that participants made significantly more maxi-
mizing choices when the randomness of the series had been clearly 
demonstrated, on card and dice based alternatives of the task respec-
tively. Yellott (1969) found that in a “noncontingent success” condition, 
introduced in the final block of a standard task, participants generated 
deterministic and patterned “superstitious” response sequences, with 
several participants spontaneously reporting having identified a pat-
tern. 
Of course, if the likelihoods of reward were not independent and 
identically distributed (IID), then the discovery of a predictable pattern 
in the reward sequence could allow for accurate prediction of future 
outcomes, leading to greater success than the exclusive selection of the 
more likely option. In this case, pattern matching could be the optimal 
response. This line of reasoning has led to the development of “smart” 
accounts of probability matching. Gaissmaier and Schooler (2008) 
found that participants with a higher working memory capacity, who 
also probability matched in the first half of their task (in which there 
was no pattern), were more likely to discover a pattern that was insert-
ed into the second half of the task. In the majority of studies, however, 
rewards on the standard task are serially independent, so any attempt 
at pattern matching is detrimental to task performance. Nevertheless, 
participants are not usually told whether or not there is such a pat-
tern in the sequence before the experiment. This means that although 
pattern-search behaviour is inevitably unsuccessful, it is based upon 
a lack or misappraisal of stimulus information, rather than being an 
inherently irrational choice strategy. It may therefore be considered an 
overextension of an otherwise normative behaviour. 
Of the relatively few recent studies that have tested the contribu-
tion of apophenia to probability matching, results have been somewhat 
inconsistent. Unturbe and Corominas (2007) found that participants 
who reported more complex rules in the sequence were more likely to 
probability match than those who did not, while Wolford, Newman, 
Miller, and Wig (2004) observed that increasing the probability of 
alternation between rewarded stimuli led to the perception of greater 
randomness and, in turn, increased levels of maximizing. By contrast, 
on a two stage task, Koehler and James (2009) found that even when 
participants had no exposure to the specific reward sequence in the 
learning phase, probability matching was equally prevalent on the sub-
sequent test phase. We test this by contrasting the choice behaviour, 
along with self-reported levels of apophenia, in participants who are 
explicitly informed that there are no predictable patterns to be found 
with participants who are left to discover this for themselves. 
Heuristics 
The second category of model assumes that probability matching is a 
heuristic-driven behaviour that can be overruled through deliberative 
reasoning. The heuristic account can be viewed in the framework of 
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dual system models of decision-making, System 1 and System 2; a ter-
minology introduced by Stanovich and West (2000) and popularised 
by Kahneman (2011) ENREF 21. System 1 refers to heuristic-based 
decision processes that are fast, automatic, and relatively effortless, 
although prone to errors, whereas System 2 processes are slower and 
generally more accurate, but require much more effort and processing 
power. 
A number of empirical results implicate System 1 in matching 
behaviour, and System 2 in deviation from it. Neimark and Shuford 
(1959) found that probability matching on a standard task shifted to 
overmatching when participants could refer back to the results of pre-
vious trials during the experiment, or when they were asked to explic-
itly estimate the reward frequencies of each option, prompting explicit 
analysis of the outcome probabilities. Similarly, Nies (1962) found sig-
nificant overmatching when participants were made explicitly aware 
of stimulus reward probabilities, as did Fantino and Esfandiari (2002). 
Another manipulation in the latter study found significant overmatch-
ing in response to providing a strategy recommendation to another 
participant midway through the task, requiring the explicit formula-
tion of such a strategy. 
Individual differences in heuristic and analytic processing are 
related to proximal indicators of intelligence. For example, West and 
Stanovich (2003) found that participants who applied a maximizing 
strategy had significantly higher SAT scores than those who probabil-
ity matched. This led them to suggest that the matching response is a 
non-normative cognitive shortcut that is fast, effortless, and relatively 
intuitive; accounting for their results in that people higher in cognitive 
ability are more efficient at deliberative reasoning and thus in identify-
ing the maximizing response. Consistent with this, Koehler and James 
(2010) found that high scorers on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), 
a test designed to assess participants’ ability to deliberatively overrule 
their initial intuitions (Frederick, 2005), were much more likely to 
maximize (74%) than low scorers (11%). They also found that both 
many more participants subsequently endorsed maximizing as the best 
strategy than had actually applied it on the preceding task and that when 
asked to consider the possible success of both matching and maximiz-
ing strategies before the task, participants were significantly more likely 
to maximize. In light of these results, the authors argued that matching 
is only the dominant response because it is more readily available than 
the maximizing strategy. They concluded that matching results from a 
failure to sufficiently engage in deliberation. Correspondingly, Kogler 
and Kuehberger (2007) found that cueing System 2, through describ-
ing the task as a statistical test rather than a lottery, led to greater maxi-
mizing. Furthermore, a number of studies have shown that increasing 
performance-based financial incentives, which may encourage partici-
pants to engage in effortful analytic processing, leads to a reduction in 
the number of participants who probability match (Brackbill, Starr, & 
Kappy, 1962; Shanks et al., 2002; Siegel & Goldstein, 1959). 
However, as with the apophenia account, the evidence is not entirely 
consistent. Jones and Liverant (1960) found significantly greater maxi-
mizing in nursery-(4–6) than elementary-age children (9–11), who 
tended to probability match. Derks and Paclisanu (1967) also found an 
overall positive relationship between age and matching across multiple 
age groups from nursery to college. These findings led to suggestions 
that maximizing is the more basic associational response, driven by 
positive recency, while probability matching results from some form 
of cognitive control. In the latter paper, studies showing that behaviour 
eventually approaches maximizing over longer tasks, up to 1,000 trials 
(Derks, 1962; Edwards, 1961), were also interpreted as being due to fa-
tigue engendering more basic association-driven responses as the task 
progressed. We tested the heuristic account of probability matching by 
contrasting choice behaviour, along with self-reported use of intuition 
versus strategy, in participants who were explicitly told the reward con-
tingencies with participants who learned them through experience. 
Overview of Experiments
The apophenia and heuristic accounts of probability matching have of-
ten been considered in isolation, with the majority of studies designed 
specifically to test one or the other. However, the two models need not 
be mutually exclusive. In the experiments that follow, we aimed to as-
sess the relative contribution of each to probability matching behaviour 
by considering the accounts together. Two factors were designed to 
respectively manipulate participants’ use of intuition versus strategy in 
determining their choices on the task, and the extent to which partici-
pants believed there to be a predictable pattern of sequential depend-
encies in the reward sequence. 
One previous study (Fantino & Esfandieri, 2002) also included 
experimental conditions designed to manipulate both strategy us-
age and pattern belief, through informing participants of the reward 
probabilities and that 75% was considered a perfect score, respectively. 
However, the latter manipulation is quite indirect, with a degree of 
inference required by participants to interpret it as related to the poten-
tial presence of a pattern. Moreover, the assumption that either of these 
manipulations operated through the mechanisms that were predicted 
remains untested. In our study, we included a post-experimental ques-
tionnaire to assess the extent to which participants adopted an intuitive 
versus strategic approach to the task and their level of belief regarding 
whether or not there had been a predictable pattern in the sequence. 
This was designed to provide an additional, more direct measure of the 
efficacy of each of our experimental manipulations. Crucially, when 
combined with the behavioural data in a mediation-analysis, this can 
provide additional evidence of the putative underlying mechanisms of 
any observed effects. The questionnaire was also designed to ascertain 
individuals’ subjective estimates of the reward contingencies. Our 
intention was to determine whether participants were well calibrated 
to the actual probabilities of reward. This also enabled a comparative 
analysis of probability matching behaviour in which interindividual 
variance in probability estimates is controlled for (cf. Koehler & James, 
2009).
ExpERImENT 1
In Experiment 1, we assessed the relative contribution of apophenia 
and heuristic processing to probability matching through manipulat-
AdvAnces in cognitive PsychologyreseArch Article
http://www.ac-psych.org2017 • volume 13(4) • 280-295283
make their choices on the basis of the colour rather than the position 
of the bulb, which was random (see Appendix A). On presentation of 
the stimuli, the participants made their predictions by pressing the q 
or p keys on a standard QWERTY keyboard to indicate the stimulus 
to the left or right side of the screen respectively. Shortly after each 
prediction (500 ms), one of the two light bulbs would be illuminated. 
Participants received a £0.02 reward for each correct prediction. The 
probability that each light would be illuminated on any one trial, and 
thus the reward contingencies of the two options, was fixed throughout 
the task. One colour bulb had a reward probability of .7 and the other 
of .3. A running total of winnings was shown throughout the task. 
At the end of the experiment, the participants completed a ques-
tionnaire (see Appendix D) in which they were asked to estimate the 
probability of reward for each light bulb (0% to 100%), the extent to 
which they believed there to have been a predictable pattern in the 
reward sequence (1 to 5), and the extent to which they relied upon 
intuition or strategy in making their predictions (1 to 5). 
Results
The proportions of maximizing responses for each 10-trial block 
are shown for each condition in Figure 1, Panel A. Distributions of 
individual proportions of maximizing choices across the entire task 
are shown in Figure 2, Panels D-E. These data were entered into a 2 
× 2 × 42 mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Probability 
(stated vs. learned) and Pattern Instruction (standard vs. no-pattern) as 
between-subjects factors and Block (1 through 42) as a within-subject 
factor. A main effect of block, F(19.13, 2218.69) = 13.80, MSe = .04, p 
ing the information provided to the participants at the start of the task. 
If probability matching results from apophenia, we predicted that ex-
plaining to participants that the sequences of outcomes were random, 
other than any overall difference in reward probabilities, would lead to 
an increase in maximizing choices compared to participants who re-
ceived no such explanation. We also predicted that explicitly providing 
participants with the outcome probabilities prior to the task would fa-
cilitate a strategic approach, reducing heuristic-based decision-making 
and increasing maximizing behaviour. 
Method
ParticiPants
One hundred and twenty members of the University of Nottingham 
community volunteered to take part in this experiment. Of these, 37 
were male and 83 were female. Their ages ranged from 18 to 52 (Mage 
= 23.27, SD = 4.91). 
Participants were paid an inconvenience allowance with a value 
contingent upon the choices that they made during the experiment. A 
maximizing strategy would accumulate an average total of £5.88, while 
matching would lead to an average pay-off of £4.87. Performance at 
chance would lead to an expected payment of £4.20. 
design
This was a 2 × 2 × 42 mixed model design with Probability (stated 
vs. learned) and Pattern (standard vs. no-pattern) as between-subjects 
factors and Block (1 to 42) as a within-subject factor. The basic ex-
perimental manipulations related to the instructions that participants 
received (see Appendix A). In the stated probability conditions, the 
participants were instructed that the outcome probabilities were 70% 
versus 30%, and in the learned probability conditions, the participants 
were not informed of the outcome probabilities. Participants in the 
no-pattern condition were told that there were no patterns in the se-
quences of outcomes and that these were entirely independent of the 
choices that they made, and participants in the standard pattern condi-
tion did not receive these instructions. 
Which of the two colours was the more likely outcome was coun-
terbalanced between participants to account for any bias in favour 
of a particular colour. All participants were randomly assigned to an 
experimental condition.
Procedure
The task was an iterated two-alternative forced choice, predicting 
whether either a blue or a yellow light bulb would flash on each of 420 
trials. There was no initial training period. Task instructions that were 
provided to participants are shown in Appendices A, B, and C. Each 
trial began with a black central fixation cross on a white background. 
The duration of the fixation varied randomly between 1 s and 2 s. 
This was followed by the appearance of the two light bulbs on the left 
and right of the computer screen. The right-left position of the two 
coloured bulbs varied randomly between trials and was not predic-
tive of reward. Participants were explicitly told in the instructions to 
Figure 1.
showing the proportions of maximizing choices over the 
course of experiment 1 (Panel A) and experiment 2 (Panel 
B). each block consisted of 10 trials. 
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Figure 2.
histograms showing the number of participants who made different proportions of maximizing choices. Panels A to c show 
responding in the first 10-trial block, Panels d to F show the average proportions of maximizing responses across the whole 
task, and Panels g to i show average proportions of steady state maximizing choices over the final third of the task. Panels A, d, 
and g show the standard condition; Panels B, e, and h show the no-pattern condition; and Panels c, F, and i-experiment 2.
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< .001, η2p = .11,1 and a significant linear effect of block, F(1, 116) = 
87.09, MSe = .10, p < .001, η2p = .43, indicated that participants learned 
to allocate more responses to the maximizing alternative as the experi-
ment progressed. A main effect of probability, F(1, 116) = 37.82, MSe = 
.58, p < .001, η2p = .25, indicated that when participants were told the 
probabilities of reward they tended to allocate more responses to the 
more likely outcome than when they had to learn it from experience 
alone. A reliable interaction between block and probability, F(19.13, 
2218.69) = 3.09, MSe = .04, p < .001, η2p = .03, and a reliable linear 
interaction between the block and probability, F(1, 116) = 15.10, MSe = 
.10, p < .001, η2p = .12, suggested that stating the probabilities affected 
the rate at which participants learned to allocate responses to the more 
likely outcome. However, there was no effect of pattern instruction (F 
< 1.00) and no interaction between probability and pattern instruction, 
F(1, 116) = 3.30, MSe = .58, p = .07, η2p = .03. There was also neither an 
interaction nor a linear interaction between block and pattern instruc-
tion (F < 1.00). These nonsignificant results indicate that informing the 
participants that there was no pattern to be found in the sequence of 
outcomes did not substantially influence their choices. There were no 
3-way interactions (F < 1.00). 
The interaction between block and probability, as shown in Figure 
1, Panel A, indicates a lower group-level learning effect in the stated 
probabilities condition. This might represent a lower learning rate 
across all participants in this condition. Alternatively, it may be ex-
plained by a sub-set of participants beginning the task either at or near 
maximizing behaviour, having reasoned that this is the optimal strat-
egy from the additional probability information given to them before 
the task began. Figure 2 shows histograms of individual-level propor-
tions of maximizing choices in the initial 10 trials of the task for each 
the standard condition (Panel A) and the no-pattern condition (Panel 
B). These clearly show that more participants in the stated probabilities 
condition maximized from the outset of the experiment. 
In order to assess experimental effects exclusively upon steady-state 
responding, a separate 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted, 
with factors of Probability Condition and Pattern Instruction, and the 
dependent variable of Proportion of Maximizing Choices made over 
the final third of the task (from trial 280 onwards). This revealed a 
main effect of probability, F(1, 116) = 15.96, MSe = .02, p < .001, η2p 
= .12, but neither a main effect of pattern instruction (F < 1.00) nor a 
reliable interaction effect, F(1, 116) = 3.01, MSe = .02, p = .09, η2p = .03. 
Distributions of individual proportions of maximizing choices over the 
final third of the task are shown in Figure 2, Panels G-H.
subjective estimates of reward Probabilities
At the end of each experiment, the participants were asked to say 
what they thought the outcome probabilities were. These data are 
shown in Table 1. To determine what effect the instructions had on 
participants’ representation of the outcome probabilities, we entered 
these subjective estimates of the outcomes into a 2 × 2 ANOVA with 
Probability (stated vs. learned) and Pattern Information (standard vs. 
no-pattern) as between-subjects factors. There was neither an effect of 
probability, F(1, 116) = 1.89, MSe = .01, p = .17, η2p = .02, nor of pattern 
information, F(1, 116) = 1.76, MSe = .01, p = .19, η2p = .02, nor a signifi-
cant interaction, F(1, 116) = 2.77, MSe = .01, p = .10, η2p = .02. 
Heuristics
Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they relied 
on strategy or intuition to make their decisions (see Table 2). These 
data were entered into a 2 × 2 ANOVA, with Probability and Pattern 
Information as between-subjects factors. A main effect of probability 
F(1, 116) = 4.80, MSe = 1.00, p = .03, η2p = .04, showed that participants 
in the stated probability conditions reported greater strategy use than 
those in the learned conditions. There was no effect of pattern instruc-
tion (F < 1.00) and no interaction between the two F(1, 116) = 1.20, 
MSe = 1.00, p = .86, η2p = .01.
aPoPHenia
Finally, participants were asked to rate their belief that the outcome 
sequences contained a pattern (see Table 3). A third 2 × 2 ANOVA 
revealed neither a significant main effect of probability condition, F(1, 
tAble 1.  
subjective estimates of outcome Probability of the high 
Probability option by condition and experiment
Pattern instruction
Standard No-pattern Experiment 2
M SE M SE M SE
Stated .685 .010 .690 .010 .692 .009
Learned .727 .020 .686 .013 .651 .017
tAble 3.  
subjective reports of Belief that outcome sequences 
contained a Pattern by condition and experiment 
Pattern instruction
Standard No-pattern Experiment 2
M SE M SE M SE
Stated 2.000 0.209 2.267 0.235 2.267 0.203
Learned 2.633 0.256 2.300 0.263 2.700 0.204
Note. Scores range from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree.
tAble 2.  
subjective reports of strategy Use 
by condition and experiment 
Pattern instruction
Standard No-pattern Experiment 2
M SE M SE M SE
Stated 3.800 0.176 3.633 0.212 4.000 0.198
Learned 3.200 0.188 3.433 0.149 3.600 0.189
Note. Scores range from 1 = pure intuition to 5 = pure strategy.
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= 3.12, MSe = .01, p = .08, η2p = .03, nor of instruction, F(1, 116) = 3.80, 
MSe = .01, p = .05, η2p = .03, nor a significant interaction (F < 1.00). 
Following this, a linear regression revealed a significant positive 
effect of reported use of a strategy over intuition on raw proportions of 
WSLS-consistent choices (b = .02, t[118] = 3.48, p < .001), with strategy 
use explaining 9% sample variance (R2 = .09).
However, it is important to consider here that a strict maximizing 
strategy will lead to a baseline proportion of .7 WSLS consistent choic-
es (comprising 100% “stay” choices of which 70% will be rewarded 
“wins”). An entirely WSLS-independent probability matching strategy 
is calculated to lead to an expected baseline of .58 WSLS-consistent 
choices. As maximizing increases the proportion of WSLS, congruent 
choices will increase independently of whether or not WSLS is actively 
pursued as an approach. This is a concern due to the large discrepan-
cies in maximizing behaviour between participants, in particular the 
systematic divergence between stated and learned probability condi-
tions and the potentially confounding relationship between maximiz-
ing and strategy use.
In order to adjust for this issue, expected baseline proportions of 
WSLS consistent choices were calculated for each participant based 
upon their proportion of maximizing choices over the entire task. 
These were then subtracted from actual proportions of WSLS consist-
ent choices as a measure of the prevalence of WSLS-like choice pat-
terns over and above what would be expected by chance. These data 
are shown in Table 5. Distributions of individual-level proportions of 
adjusted WSLS-consistent choices are shown for both standard and 
no-pattern conditions in Figure 3, panels C-D. Another 2 × 2 ANOVA 
was then conducted to assess differences in WSLS deviations from 
baseline between conditions. This revealed significant main effects of 
both probability, F(1, 116) = 11.57, MSe = .002, p < .001, η2p = .09, and 
instruction, F(1, 116) = 8.29, MSe = .002, p = .005, η2p = .07, but no sig-
nificant interaction (F < 1.00). This indicates that when participants are 
told that there is no pattern or told the reward probabilities, they tend 
to make fewer choices that are consistent with a WSLS strategy. The 
histograms suggest that only a few participants across all conditions 
made substantively more WSLS-consistent choices than their expected 
baseline. Each of these effects seems, therefore, to result predominantly 
from a modest shift across a wider range of participants towards mak-
ing slightly fewer WSLS-consistent choices when aware of the reward 
probabilities or informed that there is no predictable pattern in the 
sequence. 
116) = 1.90, MSe = 1.75, p = .17, η2p = .02, nor, surprisingly, of pattern 
instruction (F < 1.00). There was no significant interaction between the 
two factors, F(1, 116) = 1.54, MSe = 1.75, p = .22, η2p = .01.
win-stay-lose-sHift analysis
As an additional variable of interest, proportions of choices over 
the entire task that were consistent with a Win-Stay-Lose-Shift (WSLS) 
strategy were calculated for each participant. These data are shown in 
Table 4. Figure 3 shows the distributions of individual-level behaviour 
consistent with a WSLS strategy for both the standard and no-pattern 
conditions (Panels A and B respectively). A 2 × 2 ANOVA was con-
ducted to assess differences in WSLS proportions between conditions. 
This revealed neither a significant main effect of probability, F(1, 116) 
tAble 4.  
Proportions of Win-stay-lose-shift consistent 
choices by condition
Pattern instruction
Standard No-pattern
M SE M SE
Stated .694 .009 .660 .011
Learned .662 .016 .647 .013
tAble 5.  
deviation in Proportions of Win-stay-lose-shift 
consistent choices From Baseline, by condition
Pattern instruction
Standard No-pattern
M SE M SE
Stated .027 .008 .006 .007
Learned .062 .011 .031 .009
Figure 3.
histograms showing the number of participants and their 
choices that were consistent with a raw (Panels A and B) 
and adjusted (Panels c and d) Win-stay lose-shift (Wsls) 
strategy in experiment 1: Panels A and c show the standard 
condition and Panels B and d-the no-pattern condition.
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Following this, a linear regression was conducted to assess the ef-
fect of strategy use on this adjusted WSLS variable. This revealed no 
significant effect of reported strategy use (b = −.007, t[118] = −1.40, 
p = .165, R2 = .02). Interestingly, although nonsignificant, the trend is 
for WSLS choices being associated with a more intuitive rather than 
strategic approach to the task.
Discussion
The results from Experiment 1 showed that stating the probabilities of 
reward results in both a greater proportion of maximizing responses 
and an increase in the use of strategy over intuition, compared to when 
participants are left to acquire knowledge of the reward probabilities 
through experience alone. However, informing participants that there 
were no patterns in the reward sequences, and that they were inde-
pendent events, neither significantly affected proportions of maximiz-
ing choices nor reduced the tendency toward apophenia. These effects 
were equivalent whether considering choices made over the entire task 
or steady-state responding over only the final third of trials. The per-
sistence of the positive effect of stating outcome probability of the high 
probability option on maximizing choices post-learning suggests that 
this reflects a genuine difference in approach to making choices, rather 
than one resulting from the more prosaic difference in information 
available at the outset of the task. In Experiment 2, we introduced a 
potentially stronger manipulation to reduce the effect of apophenia by 
concealing the outcome of each prediction over each 10-trial block.
ExpERImENT 2
In Experiment 1, we observed that telling participants about the 
probability of the outcomes affected the predictions that they made. 
However, telling the participants that there were no patterns to be 
discovered in the sequence of outcomes, and that the outcomes were 
independent of the choices that they made, had no significant effect on 
their predictions. Moreover, although this manipulation was designed 
to reduce apophenia, we observed no effect on the participants’ per-
ception of randomness in the sequence of outcomes. In Experiment 
2, we attempted a stronger manipulation to reduce apophenia-by 
concealing the outcome of each prediction and presenting participants 
instead only with a proportion correct at the end of each 10-trial block. 
In this manner, we were hoping to preclude the possibility of observing 
a pattern in the trial-by-trial reward sequence, and therefore to reduce 
apophenia.
Method
ParticiPants
Sixty members of the University of Nottingham community volun-
teered to take part in this experiment. Of these, 23 were male and 37 
were female. Their ages ranged from 17 to 35 (Mage = 22.60, SD = 2.97). 
The methods of recruitment and of calculating individual participants’ 
inconvenience allowances were identical to Experiment 1.
design
This was a 2 × 42 mixed model design with Probability (stated vs. 
learned) as a between-subjects factor and Block (1 to 42) as a within-
subject factor. The basic experimental preparation was identical to 
Experiment 1 with the exception that the participants were only given 
the outcome of their predictions at the end of each 10-trial block. 
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 with the exception 
that participants did not see the illumination of a light bulb after each 
trial. Instead, feedback was given in written format after 10 trials. 
Results
The proportions of maximizing responses for each 10-trial block 
are shown for each condition in Figure 1, Panel B. The distribution 
of choices for the first 10 trials are shown in Figure 2, Panel C. This 
suggests, just as in Experiment 1 (Panels A and B), that participants 
tended to allocate more of their initial responses to the maximizing 
choice when they were told the reward probabilities. These data were 
entered into a 2 × 42 mixed model ANOVA with Probability (stated 
vs. learned) as a between-subjects factor and Block (1 through 42) as a 
within-subject factor. A main effect of block, F(14.63, 848.25) = 2.57, 
MSe = .10, p < .001, η2p = .04,1 and a significant linear effect of block F(1, 
58) = 19.88, MSe = .10, p < .001, η2p = .26, indicated that participants 
learned to allocate more responses to the maximizing alternative as the 
experiment progressed. A main effect of probability, F(1, 58) = 10.76, 
MSe = .78, p < .002, η2p = .16, indicated that when participants were told 
the probability of reward, they tended to allocate more responses to the 
more likely outcome than when they had to learn it from experience 
alone. There was no interaction between block and probability (F < 
1.00).
To isolate the effect of probability condition on steady-state re-
sponses, an independent samples t test was conducted. This found 
that the positive effect of stated over learned reward probabilities on 
proportion of maximizing choices remained over the final third of 
the task, t(58) = 2.46, p = .02. This effect was, therefore, again not the 
result of a discrepancy between groups during the learning phase but 
indicated a more substantive difference in decision making between 
the two conditions.
subjective estimates of reward Probabilities
Subjective estimates of outcome probability of the high probability 
option are shown in Table 1. An independent samples t test revealed 
that participants in the learned probability condition estimated the 
outcome probability of the high probability option to be lower than the 
stated probability condition, t(58) = 2.19, p = .03. 
Heuristics and aPoPHenia
Self-reports of strategic choices and belief that the outcome se-
quences contained patterns are shown in Tables 2 and 3. These did not 
differ between groups, t(58) = 1.15, p = .15; t(58) = 1.51, p = .14. 
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comParisons witH exPeriment 1
To assess the efficacy of the aggregate feedback manipulation intro-
duced in Experiment 2, these results were compared to the standard 
condition of Experiment 1. 
The proportion of maximizing responses for each 10-trial block 
were entered into a 2 × 2 × 42 mixed model ANOVA with Probability 
(stated vs. learned) and Pattern Information (standard vs. experiment 
2) as between-subjects factors and Block (1 through 42) as a within-
subject factor. A main effect of block, F(18.23, 2115.02) = 7.31, MSe = 
.062, p < .001, η2p = .06,1 and a significant linear contrast of block F(1, 
116) = 58.20, MSe = .12, p < .001, η2p = .33, indicated that participants 
learned to allocate more responses to the maximizing option as the 
experiment progressed. A main effect of probability, F(1, 116) = 39.34, 
MSe = .66, p < .001, η2p = .25, indicated that when participants were told 
the probability of reward, they tended to allocate more responses to the 
more likely outcome than when they had to learn it from experience 
alone. Although there was no reliable interaction between block and 
probability, F(18.23, 2115.02) = 1.46, MSe = .06, p = .09, η2p = .01, mod-
elling the interaction between block and probability as a linear contrast 
did reveal a significant effect, F(1, 116) = 6.91, MSe = .12, p = .01, η2p 
= .06. This suggests that stating the probabilities again affected the rate 
at which participants learned to allocate responses to the more likely 
outcome. However, there was no effect of pattern information (F < 
1.00). There were also neither significant interactions between pattern 
information and probability, F(1, 116) = 1.52, MSe = .66, p = .22, η2p = 
.01, or block, F(18.23, 2115.02) = 1.29, MSe = .06, p = .18, η2p = .01, nor a 
reliable linear interaction between pattern information and block, F(1, 
116) = 1.19, MSe = .12, p = .28, η2p = .01. These indicate that conceal-
ing the trial-by-trial outcome sequence did not influence participants’ 
choices. There were no three-way interactions (F < 1.00). 
In order to again assess experimental effects exclusively upon 
steady-state responding, a separate 2 × 2 between-subjects ANOVA 
was conducted, with factors of Probability Condition and Pattern 
Information, and the dependent variable of Proportion of Maximizing 
Choices made over the final third of the task. This revealed a main ef-
fect of probability condition, F(1, 116) = 20.54, MSe = .02, p < .001, η2p 
= .15, but neither a main effect of pattern information (F < 1.00), nor 
an interaction effect (F < 1.00).
subjective estimates of reward Probabilities
Subjective estimates of outcome probability of the high probability 
option are shown in Table 1. A 2 × 2 ANOVA was conducted with 
Probability (stated vs. learned) and Pattern Information (standard vs. 
experiment 2) as between-subjects factors. There was no effect of prob-
ability (F < 1.00). However, a main effect of pattern information, F(1, 
116) = 5.69, MSe = .006, p = .02, η2p = .05, suggested that participants in 
Experiment 2 estimated the ‘outcome probability of the high probability 
option to be lower than those in the standard condition of Experiment 
1. A reliable interaction between probability and pattern information, 
F(1, 116) = 8.23, MSe = .006, p = .005, η2p = .07, indicated that stating 
the reward probabilities moderated the difference in estimates between 
the standard condition of Experiment 1 and the aggregate feedback 
condition of Experiment 2. 
Heuristics
Self-reported use of strategy versus intuition (see Table 2) was en-
tered into a 2 × 2 ANOVA with Probability and Pattern Information as 
between-subjects factors. A main effect of probability, F(1, 116) = 7.09, 
MSe = 1.06, p = .009, η2p = .06, showed that participants in the stated 
probability conditions reported greater strategy use than those in the 
learned conditions. There was no significant effect of pattern informa-
tion, F(1, 116) = 2.55, MSe = 1.06, p = .11, η2p = .02 and no interaction 
between the two (F < 1.00).
aPoPHenia
Self-reported beliefs that the outcome sequences contained a pat-
tern (see Table 3) were entered into a third 2 × 2 ANOVA. A significant 
main effect of probability condition, F(1, 116) = 5.92, MSe = 1.44, p 
= .02, η2p = .05, indicated that participants in the learned probability 
conditions reported significantly higher levels of apophenia than those 
in the stated conditions. Surprisingly, as in Experiment 1, there was 
neither an effect of pattern information (F < 1.00) nor an interaction 
between the two factors (F < 1.00).
Discussion
Experiment 2 attempted to use a potentially stronger manipulation to 
reduce the effect of apophenia in probability learning. However, the 
effect of concealing the outcomes over each 10-trial block was as inef-
fective as simply telling participants that there was no pattern in the 
sequence. We infer from this that participants were just as capable of 
internally generating a perception of a sequential pattern as they were 
of mistakenly deriving one from an observed outcome sequence. We 
did not conduct a WSLS analysis on these data because the participants 
could not see the outcomes of individual trials and could not therefore 
base a subsequent choice on the result of any single preceding trial.
In the next section, we use mediation analysis to determine the 
extent to which the observed effect of probability condition on par-
ticipants’ choices was mediated by its effects on strategy usage and 
apophenia. 
Mediation Analyses
Experiments 1 and 2 each found a significant effect of probability condi-
tion on participants’ proportion of maximizing choices. Experiment 1 
also found a significant effect of probability condition on self-reported 
use of strategy. Although, when considered alone, the same effect did 
not reach significance within the sixty participants in Experiment 2, 
the observed effect was both in the same direction and of an equivalent 
size to the combined effect observed across Experiment 1’s conditions. 
When considering the same aggregate feedback group together with 
the standard condition of Experiment 1, the increase in power found 
the effect of probability condition on levels of apophenia as once again 
statistically significant. By contrast, no effects of pattern instruction or 
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pattern information, in Experiments 1 or 2, respectively, were found 
upon either strategy use or apophenia.
To investigate the extent to which the effect of probability condition 
on choice behaviour was mediated by its influence on participants tak-
ing a strategic versus intuitive approach to the task and their levels of 
apophenia, we conducted a mediation analysis. We used the PROCESS 
macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2012). Data was concatenated across all three 
apophenia conditions, due to the lack of effect of either pattern instruc-
tion (Experiment 1) or aggregate feedback (Experiment 2) on either 
choice behaviour, levels of strategy use, or apophenia. For this analysis, 
proportions of maximizing choices were calculated for the final third 
of the task, with the aim of accounting for learning effects. Mediation 
model Number 6 was used, with a single independent variable and two 
mediator variables. Effects were calculated for each of 10,000 boot-
strapped samples. Model results are presented in Figure 4 (variable 
coding is as follows: Stated = 0, Learned = 1; Intuition 1–5 Strategy; 
Belief no Pattern 1–5 Belief was Pattern; Proportion of Maximizing 
Choices 0–1). 
The direct effect of probability condition on strategy usage was 
found to be significant, t(178) = −2.63, p = .009, with this predictor 
accounting for 4% of the sample variance (R2 = .04). The direct effect 
of probability condition on apophenia was found to be nonsignificant, 
t(177) = 1.19, p = .24, while the direct effect of strategy use on apophe-
nia was found to be significant, t(177) = −4.31, p < .001, with these 
two predictors accounting for 11% of the sample variance (R2 = .11). 
The direct effects of probability condition, t(176) = −3.78, p < .001, 
and strategy use, t(176) = 7.35, p < .001, on proportion of maximizing 
choices were each found to be significant, whereas the direct effect of 
apophenia was not, t(176) = −0.31, p = .76. These three predictors ac-
counted for 34% of the sample variance (R2 = .34).
The unstandardized indirect effects of probability condition on 
proportion of maximizing choices were as follows: Through intuition 
versus strategy use (−.400) (.068) = −.027, with bias corrected 95% CIs 
ranging from −.051 to −.008, indicating statistical significance of this 
effect at α = .05. Through apophenia (.216) (−.002) = −.0005, with bias 
corrected 95% CIs ranging from −.009 to .003, indicating nonsignifi-
cance of this effect at α = .05. Through first strategy use then apophenia 
(−.400) (−.378) (−.002) = −.0004, with bias corrected 95% CIs ranging 
from −.004 to .002, indicating that this effect was also nonsignificant 
at α = .05.
assessment of reliability of witHin-grouP 
effects
In the mediation analysis, data from all three apophenia conditions 
were concatenated. In light of this, it remains unclear whether these 
effects are consistent between individual experimental conditions. 
To address this issue, a series of multiple regression analyses were 
conducted, for each experimental group. Predictor variables were Self-
Reported Strategy Use and Apophenia, and the dependent variable was 
Maximizing Choices over the final third of the task. Results are shown 
in Table 6.
Controlling for Variance in 
Perceived Reward Probabilities— 
Summary of a Parallel Analysis
In principle, probability matching may be accurately defined as the 
selection of each alternative in proportion to its subjectively perceived 
likelihood of reward, even where this differs from an option’s objective 
reward probability. Since the participants in the learned probabilities 
conditions were never explicitly told the reward contingencies, it fol-
lows that their perceived likelihoods may have differed from the actual 
values. Although group average estimates of these probabilities were 
generally well calibrated to actual probabilities, greater variance was 
seen in both the choice behaviour and probability estimates of partici-
pants in the learned probability conditions. Separate linear regressions 
revealed a reliable effect of perceived reward probabilities on propor-
tions of maximizing choices within the learned (b = .78, t[88] = 4.64, p 
< .001, R2 = .20) but not the stated (b = .20, t[88] = 0.97, p = .33, R2 = .01) 
reward probability conditions. This substantiated the hypothesis that 
the disproportionate variance in proportions of maximizing choices 
tAble 6.  
effects of strategy Use and Apophenia split by experimental condition
Experimental 
Condition
Strategy Use Apophenia
b p b p 
Learned Stated Learned Stated Learned Stated Learned Stated
Standard .077 .032 .019* .012* −.009 −.015 .688 .158
Instruction .086 .064 .017* <.001* .034 .013 .088 .265
Aggregate .072 .078 .011* <.001* −.049 .001 .058 .939
Note. b values are unstandardized, p values uncorrected, asterisks represent significance at α = .05.
Figure 4.
Mediation model for all participants. Unstandardized re-
gression coefficients shown with asterisk if significant. solid 
and dotted lines indicate significant and non-significant ef-
fects respectively. α = .05.
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when probabilities were learned was largely driven by individual differ-
ences in perceptions of the reward probabilities. 
At least one previous study has controlled for individual differences 
in perceived reward contingencies (Koehler & James, 2009). We ran a 
parallel analysis to investigate the effects of controlling for this variance 
in a similar manner. For this analysis, we created a new measure of 
choice behaviour: pMax–pEst. This measure accounts for between-
subjects variance in perception of reward probabilities through simply 
subtracting each participant’s subjective estimate of the reward prob-
ability of the more likely option from their proportion of maximizing 
choices over the final third of the task. Group averages are shown in 
Table 7.
The pattern of results with respect to the effect of apophenia ma-
nipulations was different from the analysis in which individual vari-
ance in perceptions of reward probabilities was not accounted for. In 
the present case, and treating the three conditions together, while there 
was no significant main effect of apophenia condition on deviation 
from matching, F(2, 174) < 1.00, a significant interaction between 
probability and apophenia conditions was evident, F(2, 174) = 4 .95, 
p = .008, η2p = .05. This effect was driven by the relatively low appar-
ent deviation from matching in the learned standard group relative to 
the learned probabilities conditions of each apophenia manipulation. 
By contrast, no sign of such an interaction effect on choice behaviour 
involving either pattern instruction or pattern information was appar-
ent in the primary analyses of Experiments 1 or 2, in which variance in 
estimates was not adjusted for.
In addition, parallel mediation analyses were conducted upon the 
dependent variable of apparent deviation from matching (pMax–pEst). 
These are not detailed here in full, for the purpose of concision, but did 
indicate a significant negative effect of apophenia within the standard 
condition only, t(56) = −3.22, p = .002. However, it is clear from our 
primary analysis that this result does not reflect any effect of apophenia 
upon proportions of maximizing choices. The alternative explanation 
is that this is an illusory effect driven instead by an unforeseen relation-
ship between apophenia and probability estimates. The presence of this 
relationship was confirmed, through correlation analysis, within the 
standard (r = .34, N = 60, p = .007) but neither instruction (r = .15, 
N = 60, p = .26) nor aggregate feedback (r = −.17, N = 60, p = .21) 
conditions. 
Reasons for the existence of this relationship are unclear. We are 
aware of no other studies that have found an equivalent effect, and it 
may represent nothing more than a statistical fluke. However, based 
upon these results, we suggest that raw proportions of maximizing 
choices are, on balance, the more reliable measure. A majority of previ-
ous studies have used this measure. However, discrepancies highlighted 
from running this parallel analysis do raise concerns, and if replicated, 
may prove a substantial consideration for any studies that wish to ad-
just for variance in perceived reward probabilities when determining 
matching behaviour.
DIsCUssION
We examined the effects of apophenia and heuristics on choice behav-
iour in a probability learning task. In Experiment 1, we manipulated 
the information that participants received in order to reduce the effects 
of apophenia and heuristic decision making. In Experiment 2, we used 
a potentially stronger manipulation, namely, concealing trial-by-trial 
outcomes, to reduce apophenia. We also collected self-report measures 
of belief that the sequence had contained a pattern, and of intuitive or 
strategic approaches to the task. 
The results of Experiment 1 indicated higher learning rates, unsur-
prisingly, in the learned probabilities condition. Relatively lower learn-
ing levels when probabilities were stated are limited by the ceiling of 
maximizing behaviour coupled with a higher initial level of maximiz-
ing responses, given the possibility of determining the optimal strat-
egy with reward contingency information before the task began. This 
pattern of results is highly congruent with those of Newell, Koehler, 
James, Rakow, and van Ravenzwaaij (2013), in which an interaction 
is described between higher initial maximizing driven by ‘top-down’ 
information and more slowly increasing levels resulting from ‘bottom-
up’ feedback-based learning. 
Overall, the explicit statement of outcome probability of the high 
probability option led participants to make a significantly greater pro-
portion of maximizing choices than when probabilities required learn-
ing through experience. Similar effects have been reported by both 
Nies (1962) and Fantino and Esfandiari (2002). Steady-state analyses 
revealed this to remain the case even in the post-learning period of the 
task. In fact, strikingly, the average proportion of maximizing choices 
over the final 10 of the 420 trials, for participants who had to learn 
reward contingencies through experience alone (M = .79, SE = .04), 
remained lower than the equivalent proportion on the first 10 trials for 
participants who were explicitly informed of reward probabilities be-
fore the task (M = .85, SE = .03). This suggests that there may be some 
qualitative impediment to reaching the maximizing response through 
experience alone. It also extends a finding of Newell and Rakow (2007) 
that there is a negative effect of experience relative to description after 
60 trials. 
Participants in the stated probabilities conditions were also found 
to be significantly more likely to take a strategic, rather than intuitive 
approach to the task. By contrast, explicitly telling participants that 
the reward sequence would be random, with no predictable pattern, 
neither significantly affected choice behaviour nor levels of apophenia. 
This lack of behavioural effect of stressing the randomness of the se-
quence seems inconsistent with the findings of both Rubinstein (1959) 
tAble 7.  
deviation of choices from Probability estimates 
Within each experimental group
Experimental 
Condition
pMax–pEst 
Learned Stated
Standard .078 (.027) .259 (.015)
Instruction .168 (.025) .219(.023)
Aggregate .170 (.027) .224 (.019)
Note. SEs are shown in parentheses.
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and Peterson and Ulehla (1965). However, the absence of any effect 
upon even self-reported levels of apophenia suggested that written 
instructions might simply not be sufficient to convince participants of 
the randomness of the sequence. 
In addition, we assessed the proportion of choices within each con-
dition of Experiment 1 that was predictable by a simple WSLS strategy, 
while controlling for the confounding effect of raw proportions of 
maximizing choices. This revealed that participants made significantly 
fewer WSLS-consistent choices when probabilities were stated before 
the task, and also when they were instructed that there would be no 
predictable pattern in the reward sequence. No significant relationship 
was found between strategy-use and proportions of WSLS-consistent 
choices, while the trend was for WSLS-choice behaviour to be related to 
an intuitive rather than strategic approach to the task. This result seems 
to run contrary to a finding of Otto, Taylor, and Markman (2011) that 
WSLS behaviour was less prevalent in participants in a dual-task situa-
tion that was designed to compromise executive resources.
In Experiment 2, we concealed the outcome sequence from par-
ticipants, providing reward feedback in aggregate format over 10-trial 
blocks. We hypothesised that this would be a stronger method of re-
ducing apophenia than simply informing participants that there would 
be no pattern. However, comparing this dataset with the standard 
condition of Experiment 1 revealed that aggregating feedback was also 
ineffective, both at influencing choice behaviour and reducing levels 
of apophenia. The absence of any effect here is surprising, particularly 
considering that, in an almost identical manipulation, Gao and Corter 
(2015) did find an effect of presenting grouped rather than single trials. 
It is instead more consistent with the outcome of Koehler and James 
(2009) who also demonstrated no effect of providing outcome infor-
mation in aggregate format, although the present study masked trial-
by-trial outcomes that were concurrent with responses rather than the 
outcomes of an independent pre-task learning phase.
In a novel development with respect to the findings of previous 
studies that have investigated the effects of heuristics or apophenia on 
probability matching, we applied a mediation analysis to more clearly 
delineate the pathways of action of any observed effects. This revealed 
a significant indirect effect of stating reward probabilities, via facilita-
tion of strategy use over intuition, on choice behaviour. This finding 
corroborates the mechanism by which this experimental manipulation 
was hypothesised to take effect. These findings are consistent with a 
heuristic-based account of probability matching, by which matching is 
an intuitive response and maximizing depends upon more rational de-
liberation, as espoused by Kogler and Kuehberger (2007) and Koehler 
and James (2010).
This mediation analysis also indicated that not only were attempted 
manipulations of apophenia ineffective, but that apophenia itself had 
no substantive effect on choice behaviour. This fails to replicate re-
sults of Unturbe and Corominas (2007). It is important to note that 
our questionnaire can only account for post-experimental levels of 
apophenia. It is possible that some participants did, at times during the 
task, believe there to be a pattern in the sequence, subsequently learn-
ing this not to be the case. This is an interesting consideration and may 
merit further study in itself. However, as we compare the effects of ap-
ophenia on steady-state responding, it is ultimately steady-state levels 
of apophenia that we are concerned with, for which post-experimental 
questioning should be suited to capture an accurate measure.
One further intriguing result of the mediation analysis was that it 
highlighted a significant negative relationship between strategy use and 
apophenia, despite pattern search being a seemingly strategic approach. 
This is likely due to a substantial subset of participants who applied a 
highly deliberative approach in determining that the maximizing strat-
egy was optimal, and who also realized that this was incompatible with 
the presence of a predictable pattern in the reward sequence.
To emphasize the reliability of these findings, a series of separate 
multiple regression analyses revealed that the significant positive effect 
of strategy use on steady-state proportions of maximizing choices was 
evident within each of the six experimental conditions, across both 
experiments. By contrast, there was no significant effect of reported 
apophenia evident in any of these conditions.
A parallel analysis was also conducted in which individual dif-
ferences in participants’ estimates of the reward contingencies was 
adjusted for, in a similar manner to that of Koehler and James (2009). 
This analysis revealed remarkably different results than our primary 
analysis with respect to the apparent effects of apophenia on choices. 
However, further investigation revealed that these effects were driven 
by a perplexing relationship between levels of apophenia and estimates 
of reward probabilities, which was present only within the standard 
task condition.
In summary, our results fail to replicate previous findings that have 
implicated apophenia as a key determinant of probability matching. 
They do, however, indicate a robust effect of intuition versus strategy 
use and support the conclusion that this is the primary factor behind a 
predisposition toward matching or maximizing behaviour respectively. 
Furthermore, a mediation analysis provided statistical verification of 
the hypothesis that the increase in maximizing behaviour when re-
ward probabilities are stated is driven largely by the promotion of a 
more strategic approach to the task. These findings are consistent with 
a heuristic-based account, by which the matching response is prepo-
tent when the decision-maker acts intuitively, but may be overruled if 
the maximizing strategy is recognized. Additional findings included 
an unforeseen relationship between self-reported levels of apophenia 
and perceived reward probabilities, higher levels of WSLS-consistent 
choices when participants began the task naive of either reward contin-
gencies or the statistical independence of outcomes, and the absence of 
any reliable relationship between WSLS and overall strategy use.
footnotes
1 Degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction for violations of sphericity.
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AppENDIx A
Task instructions. Slide 1.
Welcome to the experiment. You will be presented with a series of 
choices. On each trial, a yellow and a blue light bulb will be shown to 
either side of the screen. Later in the trial, one of these will switch on. 
Your task is to predict the bulb that will subsequently switch on in each 
trial. For each correct choice, 2p will be added to your total winnings. 
You can choose between these lights by pressing the q key for the op-
tion shown to the left of the screen, or the p key for the option shown to 
the right of the screen. The side to which each colour bulb is presented 
will vary randomly between trials. The aim is to win as much money as 
possible throughout the task, by predicting the correct light colour on 
as many trials as possible. Once you have read and understood the task 
instructions, press the space bar to continue. If you have any questions, 
please ask the experimenter.
AppENDIx B
Task instructions. Additional reward probability information (only 
shown in Stated probabilities group).
Further information: On each trial, the probability of the blue bulb 
switching on will be 0.7, while the probability of the yellow bulb switch-
ing on will be 0.3. This means that the blue bulb can be expected, on 
average, to switch on in 70% of trials, and the yellow bulb, on average, 
to switch on in 30% of trials. Once you have read and understood this 
information, press the space bar to continue. If you have any questions, 
please ask the experimenter.
AppENDIx C
Task instructions. Additional pattern information (only shown in 
“Instruction” apophenia manipulation).
Further information: One colour bulb may turn on more often than 
the other one. Other than this, the bulbs will turn on at random. There 
will be no pattern or other way to accurately predict which of the two 
lights will turn on in each trial. Once you have read and understood 
this information, press the space bar to continue. If you have any ques-
tions, please ask the experimenter. 
AppENDIx D
Wording of questionnaire items (with the yellow light as the high re-
ward probability option).
 
Please estimate on what proportion of trials (%) the yellow and blue 
lights switched on over the entire task.
Yellow Light:            %
Blue Light:             %
Overall, to what extent do you feel that you used your intuition to 
make your choices on the task, as opposed to any explicitly held plan 
or strategy?
(1 = pure intuition, 5 = pure strategy)
1  2 3 4 5
Please answer whether you agree or disagree with the following 
statements (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = slightly disagree, 3 = unsure, 4 = 
slightly agree, 5 = strongly agree):
There was a pattern in the sequence.
1  2 3 4 5
